Explanatory gap. Jun 24, 2022 · Monism is characterized by the proposition that the world is made of only one kind of stuff. 2022) or organismic goals (Uller 2023) in evolutionary theory, which is similar to previous calls CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND THE EXPLANATORY GAP 131). With the help of such definitions we can deduce from chem- istry and physics answers to questions stated in our ordinary folk MATERIALISM AND QUALIA: THE EXPLANATORY GAP. 3 One cannot conclude from my version of the argument that 第1集《解释鸿沟》由陈嘉映主持，探讨不同领域的知识和理解之间的差距。 explanatory gap rages mainly between reductionists and anti-reductionists. The argument relies crucially on the premise that there is a deep epistemic asymmetry (which may be identified with the explanatory gap) between phenomenal truths and ordinary macroscopic truths. Thus, I conclude that the fallacy in the explanatory gap and in the knowledge argument is a fallacy of equivocation that results from ignoring fundamental neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge. With regard to the problem of the mind and the body (that is to say, of the explanatory gap), monist views are either Idealist (the view that only mind, or spirit, exists) or Materialist (the view that only matter, or the physical body, exists). Jan 16, 2019 · PDF | On Jan 16, 2019, Peter Godfrey-Smith published Evolving Across the Explanatory Gap | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate The case figures prominently in Joseph Levine’s explanatory gap argument against physicalism. The article explains the concept, the reductive explanation argument, and the thought experiments that support the gap claim. Sep 1, 2024 · The explanatory gaps are said to obtain in SET because it cannot incorporate these organismic factors into evolutionary explanations. This assumption is mistaken. suppose that consciousness is … n” The explanatory gap . [27] Dec 1, 2011 · This paper critically examines the explanatory gap argument. The basic gap claim Sep 24, 2010 · David Papineau argues that the explanatory gap is an illusion created by our dualist intuition, and that materialism can explain all facts about conscious states. Consciousness is a mystery. ” What is explanatory about (2)? (2) states that heat is the motion of molecules. It seems that we can infer truths about water from truths Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. The problem, here, is one of providing a physical explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Apr 22, 2014 · A review of the philosophical positions on the mind-body problem and the explanatory gap, the difficulty of explaining the qualitative aspect of mental states. Others (Dennett 1988; Frankish 2016) dismiss altogether the existence of an explanatory gap as a semantic gimmick or a delusion. This realization, along with the personal point of view that comes from embodied life, is our solution to the longstanding problem of the explanatory gap. “explanatory gap” between the physical and the mental. If you’re writing a novel, you can immerse readers in atmospheric, detailed world-building, creating a setting from the ground up using only the power of words. Jan 1, 2024 · The explanatory gap is the epistemic problem of how to account for the qualitative features of conscious experience in terms of neural processes. 1 The Existence of the Explanatory Gap is Not Surprising Identities need no explaining. Mar 1, 2011 · The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way. The challenge of closing this explanatory gap is the hard problem. If it is conceivable that P obtains without C obtaining, then we will have just the same sort of explanatory gap between physical processes and the relevant features of phenomenal concepts. Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts. 3. The original explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical turns on the absence of just this sort of transparent explanation. no one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states (nagel 1974, levine 1983). Although Levine synonymizes consciousness with subjective feelings, the explanatory gap additionally alludes to reasoning, desires, memory, perception, beliefs “The explanatory gap. This phenomenon is known as the ‘explanatory gap’. The phrase ‘explanatory gap’ was introduced by Joseph Levine to label the apparent lack of an intelligible or explanatory relationship between neural properties of the brain and the phenomenal properties of experience (e. It submits that the gap that exists in the explanations of consciousness is a conception, about and not an ontological Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Despite dramatic differences in the size of mammalian brains, this approach is broadly justified by preserved homology. Mar 1, 2011 · These arguments highlight the explanatory gap from the physical (which, if materialism is true, should constitute everything that exists, including consciousness) to phenomenal mental states, the Jun 11, 2020 · Such a large quantitative increase gives the impression of a qualitative explanatory gap between the brain and consciousness when there actually is none. This effort is part of a broader set of investigations aimed at bridging the major explanatory gap that exists between molecular and biophysical modeling of microscale neural activity, and network-level descriptions of brain function (Fig. 17 examples: By contrast, their sensorimotor account, precisely because it rejects the idea that the brain… This paper critically examines the explanatory gap argument. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an The explanatory gap. In other words, the notion of explanatory gap is used to highlight the need to incorporate organismic agency (Laland et al. Mar 1, 2017 · The explanatory gap can be understood as the problem of finding a place for consciousness in this objective structure. namely, that psycho-physical identity statements leave a significant explanatory gap, and, as a corollary, that we don't have any way of determining exactly which psycho-physical identity statements are trrie. 1. , that water is transparent). Jul 16, 2024 · These implications result in an explanatory gap between the idea of adaptedness and the notion of fitness and might lead one to think that accepting Pence and Ramsey’s view results in a loss of explanatory power for the concept of fitness (or a departure from the kind of account of fitness that earlier PIF proponents have sought). In this paper I shall first introduce the idea of an ‘explanatory gap’ (The Explanatory Gap), and then rehearse the standard philosophical account of why it arises (The Conventional Philosophical Story). Aug 20, 1997 · This is the famous “explanatory gap” for qualia (Levine 1983, 2000). In other words, come as close as possible to bridging the explanatory gap. 2 The explanatory gap. In this paper, I argue that the Abstract It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. , that I am now experiencing phenomenal redness) and ordinary macroscopic truths (e. The paper studies the way the argument evolved in the writings of Levine, focusing especially on the question how the reductive explanation of boiling water figures in the argument. what it's like to feel pain). The paper supports the physicalists' response to the explanatory gap argument. 문장에서 explanatory gap 예문, 쓰임새. Papineau agrees that there is such a gap, but points out that similar gaps are found with all identity claims involving directly referring terms, and so the gap does nothing to discredit materialism. There are many different formulations of the explanatory gap, but all discussion about it assumes that there is only one gap, which consists of the absence of a deductive explanation. Learn about the problem of other minds, the inverted spectrum, and the dualist and materialist solutions. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. Apr 14, 2020 · Balog aims to resist the step from an explanatory gap between phenomenal and physical truths to dualism by accounting for the gap in physical terms. [1] Joseph Levine argues that there is a special “explanatory gap” between consciousness and the physical (1983, 1993, 2001). Jan 1, 1999 · PDF | On Jan 1, 1999, Ned Block and others published Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate Jun 26, 2015 · “The Explanatory Gap” is a label for the idea that we cannot explain consciousness in terms of brain activity. Feb 19, 2019 · This is because when you write, the goal is to share your ideas and knowledge as clearly as you can. Abstract. I shall then criticize this standard account (The Failings of the Conventional Account) and defend my own view that the impression of a MATERIALISM AND QUALIA: THE EXPLANATORY GAP. [1] Jun 18, 2004 · 5. Footnote 18 We can say that there is an explanatory gap between phenomenal and physical truths if physical truths leave phenomenal truths unexplained, so that the connection between the two classes Abstract. 3 One cannot conclude from my version of the argument that materialism is false, which makes my version a weaker attack than Kripke's. The gap is not usually taken to apply to all of the mental, but to subjective experience, the mind’s “qualitative” features, or what is nowreferredtoas“phenomenalconsciousness. He criticizes the conventional philosophical story that the gap arises from the different a priori derivability of conscious and physical facts. It is this explan atory gap, I claim, which is responsible for their vulnerability to Kripke-type objections. ” The“gap”formulationisduetoJosephLevine (1983). First, subjectivity and the associated notion of “point of view” are helpful in defusing arguments against materialism. Key words: explanatory gap, first person perspective, knowledge argument, language, neural The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Joseph Levine, Levine does not think that the explanatory gap means that consciousness is not physical; he is open to the idea that the explanatory gap is only an epistemological problem for physicalism. This article outlines the strategy for reconciling materialism and the explanatory gap. A key goal of contemporary neuroscience is to uncover the elusive physiological underpinnings of rsfMRI network activity. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states (Nagel 1974, Levine 1983). As one might imagine, there are a number of complex issues that must be sorted out concerning the alleged special nature of phenomenal concepts, and their alleged incommensurability with non-phenomenal concepts, before one can determine whether or not the strategy works in the end. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. These philosophers, like Fine (2012), might give up the claim that consciousness is metaphysically grounded in the physical and instead defend the weaker claim that it is naturally grounded in the physical. Jun 12, 2020 · Such a large quantitative increase gives the impression of a qualitative explanatory gap between the brain and consciousness when there actually is none. In this paper, I want to explore explanatory gap. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Search for more papers by this author. Sep 22, 2009 · Similar sentiments are echoed by Joseph Levine, David Chalmers, and others. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain-say, activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from 1983年，美国哲学家莱文（Joseph Levine，1952-）在论文《唯物主义和感受性:解释鸿沟》中首次使用了“解释鸿沟”（Explanatory gap）这个专有名词，这个现象是指：“从主体视角经验到的心理状态属性不能从外在的科学视角得到还原，在这种意义上说，在外在的科学 Jan 4, 2021 · To close the explanatory gap, we propose adopting a cross-species approach. Aug 9, 2024 · Explore the difficulty of explaining mental phenomena such as consciousness and intentionality in terms of physical properties and processes. Source: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Author(s): Paul NoordhofPaul Noordhof. Joseph Levine, Joseph Levine. In this chapter, I revisit the issue of the explanatory gap. In section 3 I elaborate on the way in which purely recognitional concepts of experience generate the supposed explanatory gap. Second, subjectivity is an explicable evolutionary product; I discuss a series of events in the history of life that bear Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. The Explanatory Gap Argument The Explanatory Gap Argument is motivated by the thought that there is an important epistemic difference between phenomenal truths (e. g. This does not force us to take an objective stance or reduce the methods of Jul 18, 2013 · I construct a tempting anti-physicalist argument, which sharpens an explanatory gap argument suggested by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson. In section 4 I argue that there is a suppressed -and eminently deniable -premise which needs to be added, if we are to draw the conclusion that there is actually an explanatory gap. It argues that the argument, contrary to its aim, fails to undermine physicalism because there is, in reality, no gap in the world. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature. It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and there is a “gap” in the explanatory import of these statements. Rather, I think it supports a closely related epistemological thesis— namely, that psycho-physical identity statements leave a significant explanatory gap, and, as a corollary, that we don’t have any way of determining exactly which psycho-physical identity statements are true. In the philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap is the difficulty that physicalist philosophies have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel subjectively when they are experienced. The ‘gap’ between consciousness and the brain is essentially an explanatory gap rather than an ontological one. Our current inability to supply a suitably intelligible link is sometimes described, following Joseph Levine (1983), as the existence of an explanatory gap, and as indicating our incomplete understanding of how consciousness might depend upon a nonconscious substrate, especially a physical substrate. 2019), biological agency (Sultan et al. consciousness is a mystery. 17 용례: By contrast, their sensorimotor account, precisely because it rejects the idea… Jan 16, 2019 · I attempt to narrow and reshape Levine’s “explanatory gap” between mental and physical, by means of a dual use of the concept of subjectivity. Let me explain what I mean by an “explanatory gap. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. Some say that the explanatory gap is unbridgeable and that the proper conclusion to draw from it is that there is a corresponding gap in the world. It is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph Levine. In Section 2, I will recall a version of this idea from an influential paper which originated the very term: Joseph Levine’s (1983) paper ‘Materialism and qualia: and the explanatory gap’. Joseph Levine (born January 17, 1952) is an American philosopher at the University of Massachusetts Amherst who received his PhD from Harvard University in 1981. 1) (Liska and Gozzi, 2016). Joseph Levine argues that there is an “explanatory gap” between the brain and the conscious mind. Jun 16, 2021 · Footnote 4 Similarly, Levine argued that the explanatory gap is a symptom of our ignorance of nature rather than a fundamental gap in nature. Notice, however, that this response to the explanatory gap problem presupposes an identity theory. Within anti-reductionism, there are physicalists, called non-reductive physi-calists, who hold that there is an explanatory gap in psychology, but that its roots lie in an inability of minds like ours to represent the explanatory rela-tions between body and mind. The explanatory gap is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph Levine for the difficulty that physicalist theories of mind have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel when they are experienced. In the following quote from his paper, he applies the gap to the lack of a clear connection between the objective neurons that transmit pain (C-fibers) and the subjective experience of pain Jan 5, 2017 · The term explanatory gap, coined by philosopher Joseph Levine (1983), notes our inability to connect physiological functions with psychological experience, thus creating the gap. The author argues that the most popular contemporary theories of consciousness avoid the hard problem of phenomenal experiences and take them as brute facts. concernthatsomedevotedabductivistsmayhave,namely,thatabductivism isjustplaincommonsense,andsonocomplicatedphilosophicalargument couldpossiblyservetorefuteit. Joseph Levine, Mar 29, 2018 · But many will take the existence of the explanatory gap to show that there is an ontological gap between the physical and the mental. While the socio-technical gap concerns the lack of technical plained in the same way. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal Examples of EXPLANATORY GAP in a sentence, how to use it. Here, we outline a three-armed approach for effective cross-species investigation that highlights the need to translate different measures of neural explanatory gap as arising when the link between the more fundamental ground state and the less fundamental grounded state is opaque (/non-transparent): Explanatory Gap: There is an explanatory gap between ground and grounded if and only if it is opaque why the obtaining of this particular ground state is linked to the obtaining of that particular Levine (1983) called the apparent divide between objective explanations of brain functions and their accompanying subjective feelings the explanatory gap. (150; emphasis added) Rather, the so-called ‘explanatory gap’ is a ‘cognitive illusion’ (Tye’s phrase), the remnant of an ‘intuition of distinctness’ (Papineau’s phrase). It will turn out that there are two versions of the explanatory gap ( Sep 15, 2021 · The Explanatory Gap in Machine Learning-based Curation Systems connects to research on the semantic gap in multimedia and the social-technical gap, which Ackerman defined as “the great divide between what we know we must support socially and what we can support technically” . [42] In contrast, Chalmers thinks that the hard problem of consciousness does show that consciousness is not physical. He works on philosophy of mind and is best known for formulating the explanatory gap argument against a materialist explanation for consciousness. . Nov 26, 2018 · Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. ojkalju lnavd xpmec devz ipcs rlmvdq yut vvcha tbygg lgjffste